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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE DRUG
INDUSTRY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE GOVERNMENT
Merrill Goozner*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In a 2004 essay for the Hastings Center, University of Minnesota
bioethicist Carl Elliott gave a witty account of how academic and
government scientists who get money from the pharmaceutical industry
assure the public that those financial ties have no influence on their
behavior: "The degree of dissembling and rationalization here might be
funny if the stakes were not high."' He continued:
"I take the money but it doesn't influence me." "I take the money from
many different sources in order to keep my objectivity." "I take the
money but I make sure that no more than forty percent of our center's
funding comes from corporate sources." "I take the money but I
always disclose." "I take the money but I say what I want." Or my
favorite: "I take the money but I use it to advocate for social justice."
The rationalizations always begin with the phrase: "I take the money."
No one will just say no.2
Actually, many physicians and scientists involved in health care do
say no, and they represent a vastly underutilized resource when it comes
to ending the conflicts of interest arising from the drug industry's
relationship with the government. But before I get to solutions to this
problem, allow me to outline why I believe this is a problem of the firstorder magnitude--one that must be resolved if we are going to restore

* Merrill Goozner directs the Integrity in Science Project at the Center for Science in the
Public Interest in Washington, D.C.
1. Carl Elliot, Pharma Goes to the Laundry: Public Relations and the Business of Medical
Education, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 18, 22.
2. Id.
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the public's faith in the integrity of the government's drug oversight
system.
And make no mistake about it-in the wake of the Vioxx scandal,
which resulted in the unnecessary deaths of tens of thousands of
Americans, the public's faith in the Food and Drug Administration is
definitely shaken. According to a Harris Poll taken in May 2006, only
thirty-six percent of the public thought the FDA was doing a "good" or
"excellent" job with respect to its oversight of drug safety and efficacy,
while fifty-eight percent thought it was doing a "fair" or "poor" job.
Just two years earlier, the response was just the opposite: fifty-six
percent thought the agency's performance in this area was good or
excellent while only thirty-seven percent thought it was fair or poor.4
Lest you think this sharp slide in public opinion is entirely
attributable to the publicity that surrounded Merck's travails with Vioxx,
there were other questions in the poll suggesting that the public's
concerns about industry influence over the FDA go much deeper than
just safety. Over sixty percent of the public in this poll negatively
viewed the agency's function of hastening the market entry of low-cost
generics.5 Only twenty-one percent of those surveyed, however, believed
the agency's primary function was to bring innovative medicines to
market, 6 which is industry's primary concern. Compare this to the fiftyeight percent whose number one fear was drug safety.7 Yet, that public
rejection of the industry's primary issue is not a recent concern. Safety
also trumped innovation as a concern by a fifty-four to twenty-three
margin two years prior to this survey, before Vioxx hit the headlines.
II.

THE FDA: A TROUBLED AGENCY

Why has an agency once thought of as the "gold standard" among
federal regulatory agencies fallen on hard times? The economics
literature has a phrase that describes the underlying phenomenon-it is
called industry capture. A quarter century into the anti-regulatory
3. The FDA 's Reputation with the General Public Is Under Assault, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE/HARRIS INTERACTIVE HEALTH-CARE POLL (Harris Interactive Inc., Rochester, N.Y., May
26,
2006),
at
4
tbl.2A,
available at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/
newsletters/wsjhealthnews/WSJOnline HI Health-CarePoIl2006vol5 iss09.pdf
(classifying
"excellent" and "good" as "positive responses" and "fair" and "poor" as "negative" responses).
4. Id.
5. See id. at l.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 2.
8. Id. at 5.
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backlash that began in the late 1970s and took off when Ronald Reagan
entered office, it is fair to say that the nation's food and drug watchdog
has been qualitatively transformed. Today, it is an under funded lapdog.
The agency's primary concern-by a statute passed in 1992-is
expediting the review of new drug and device applications. This focus is
mandated in the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 ("PDUFA")9
and the companion Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of
2002 ("MDUFMA").10 User fees today account for one-fifth of all
agency funds." But they command a disproportionate share of agency
resources because the agency is required to match the user fees with
comparable discretionary resources. The result: In 2005, the agency had
12
2395 full-time staff dedicated to evaluating new drug applications,
around 150% of the level in 1995.13 Moreover, the law quite specifically
spells out how the use of industry funds should be measured. Every
with shortening the time it takes to
performance measure has to do
14
approve a new drug application.
The result is that virtually every other function of the agency has
been systematically starved of the resources needed to carry out its
mandates. Take drug safety, for example. The Institute of Medicine's
thorough-going critique of the FDA's drug safety system, which was
released in September 2006, points out that PDUFA's first two
iterations, which must be reauthorized every five years, specifically
proscribed the allocation of user fees for drug safety work. The third
9. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, §§ 101(a), 102(3), 106
Stat. 4491 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379g note (2000)).
10. Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-250, 116 Stat.
1588, 1589 § 101(3) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379i note (2006)). MDUFMA was enacted
to authorize fees that would be "dedicated to meeting the goals identified in the letters from the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate, as
set forth in the Congressional Record." Id. Defraying the FDA's costs in "expediting review of
device applications" was included among these goals. H.R. REP. No. 107-728, pt. 2, at 4 (2002).
11. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-97, 119 Stat. 2120, 2147-48 (codified in scattered sections of
7 U.S.C. 2006)) (appropriating $1,838,567,000 to the FDA for fiscal year 2006, with $356,950,000
originating from, among other user fees, PDUFA and MDUFMA).
Detail of Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Employment Program Level,
12. FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2006/HTML/Tables/DetailFTEEmp.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2007).
13. Daniel Carpenter et al., Approval Times for New Drugs: Does the Source of Fundingfor
exhibit
1,
at W3-621
17,
2003,
AFF.,
Dec.
FDA
Staff Matter?, HEALTH
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.618v I .pdf ("web exclusive").
14. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 153-62 (Alicia Baciu et al. eds., 2006).
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iteration, up for its fourth renewal this year, allowed the use of these fees
for drug safety under very limited conditions-just post-marketing
surveillance for the first two or three years a drug is on the market.
Today, the entire Office of Drug Safety, which has primary
responsibility for post-approval drug safety monitoring, has just ninety
people. The FDA likes to point out that it has 700 people working on
safety, but the vast majority of those staffers are working on premarketing Phase I safety reviews on new drugs, not post-marketing
surveillance.
Drug safety is not the only part of the FDA starved for resources.
The recent spinach E. coli outbreak has brought the issue of food safety
once again before the public. In the wake of 9/11, Congress appropriated
additional funds to beef up food safety inspections, especially for the
growing proportion of our food that comes from abroad. 15 And 200 staff
members were added to that department. Yet, since 2003, the FDA's
Center for Food Safety and Nutrition budget has been cut by twentyseven percent and staffing
reduced by fourteen percent. Staffing is now
16
levels.
pre-9/11
below
The other inspection divisions of the agency are also a pale shadow
of their former selves. Inspections of domestic and overseas drug
manufacturing plants and the policing of false claims in advertising,
especially in the unregulated supplements market, but also for regulated
drugs, are down across the board. According to a report issued by the
Democratic minority in the House Government Reform Committee last
June, FDA warning letters fell fifty percent between 2000 and 2005.17
The user fee acts are a structural conflict of interest that must be
resolved if the agency is going to once again become the gold standard
for federal regulatory agencies. Even if Congress were to substantially
increase the agency's discretionary funds, if it does not simultaneously
end or restructure the user fee system, the scientists in the Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research will remain subject to the subtle pressures

15. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, §§ 301-302, 116 Stat. 594, 662-63 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 341
note (2006)).
16. Press Release, Statement of CSPI Executive Director Michael Jacobson, Ctr. for Sci. in
the Pub. Interest, Coalition for a Stronger FDA Says Agency Needs More Resources (Sept. 25,
2006), http://www.cspinet.org/new/200609251 .html.
17. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM-MINORITY STAFF, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PRESCRIPTION FOR HARM: THE DECLINE N FDA ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY 7 (2006), available at

http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20060627101434-98349.pdf.
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formed when their job security is tied up in maintaining a friendly
environment for the companies they are regulating.
Strong leadership at the FDA could have mitigated some of the
pressures created by the structural conflict of interest arising out of the
user fee acts. Under President Clinton, FDA commissioner David
Kessler did an admirable job going after the tobacco companies, but left
the pharmaceutical industry pretty much alone. 18 The result: New
records were set for new drug approvals during his tenure. But new
records were also set for drug withdrawals as a slew of unsafe drugs hit
the market. 9 In this decade, under President George W. Bush, the
agency has largely operated in a leadership vacuum. The previous
commissioner, Lester Crawford, resigned because of a conflict of
interest scandal. 20 And the new commissioner, cancer surgeon Andrew
von Eschenbach, came to the FDA after several years atop the National
Cancer Institute ("NCI").
Dr. von Eschenbach's tenure represents another structural conflict
of interest. NCI and the broader National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), of
which it is a part, are the public sector's health care research and
development departments. Their mission is to investigate the causes and,
more importantly, come up with cures for disease. An internal study
conducted a decade ago found that NCI developed, almost entirely on its
own, eighty percent of the first fifty-nine cancer chemotherapy drugs. It
runs a nationwide network of clinical trial centers-the Cancer
Oncology Groups-that remain the backbone for testing new cancer
drugs for government and industry alike. As head of NCI, Dr. von
Eschenbach was a forceful advocate for "eliminating death and suffering
from cancer by 2015.,,21 He believes the exponential growth of genetic
information about cancer has created the intellectual foundation for
finally conquering this dreaded disease, and he sees it as his mission to
more rapidly facilitate the creation of new tools, diagnostics and
therapies based on this knowledge. I have no problem with Dr. von
Eschenbach's advocacy, although as David Willman's reporting at the
18. See Marian Burros, F.D.A. Commissioner Is Resigning After 6 Stormy Years in Office,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1996, at Al.
19. See Sabin Russell, FDA Lax in DrugSafety, Journal Warns, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 23, 2004,
at Al (noting that drug recalls rose to 5.4% during 1997-2001, up from 1.6% in the previous four
years).
20. In October 2006, Lester Crawford pleaded guilty to charges that he owned stock in firms
regulated by the FDA while he was commissioner. Ex-head of Food Agency Pleads Guilty of Lying,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 18, 2006, at 8.
21. Matthew Chayes, Cancer Cure Goal Praised,Criticized, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2006, at C3.
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Los Angeles Times has shown, numerous scientists at NIH, including at
NCI, went overboard in building relationships with industry, to the point
where their conflicts of interest actually got in the way of developing
effective therapeutics. 22 I believe in government-industry collaboration
in research and development. But as the head of NCI or any agency at
NIH, it is one's job to ensure that agency scientists collaborate in an
evenhanded way with all industry comers. Alternatively, one must not
let individual conflicts of interest stand in the way of broad
dissemination of knowledge generated with taxpayer funds. In short,
helping scientists-whether they are in government or industry-to
develop cures for disease is the agency head's job. It is not part of that
job to sign special deals with specific firms for personal financial gain.
Unfortunately, Dr. von Eschenbach has brought the same mindset
to the FDA, which fundamentally confuses the purposes of the two
agencies. The FDA's job is to ensure that applicants prove that their new
drugs are, number one, safe, and number two, effective. In enforcing
those standards over time, the FDA has proved a valuable handmaiden
for industry, in effect teaching it how to do its job and creating a level
playing field for industry competition. But its essence is to be the arbiter
of safety and efficacy, to wear green eyeshades, so to speak. To put a
cheerleader for new cures based on still largely unproven theories about
genetically targeted therapies atop the agency is to fundamentally
misunderstand what the FDA is supposed to be about. That the Bush
Administration then appointed Scott Gottlieb, a thirty-three year old
physician, who moonlighted as a drug industry stock analyst for a Wall
Street newsletter, as deputy commissioner simply compounded the error
and the functional confusion that has characterized the leadership of the
agency for most of this decade.

III.

INDUSTRY INFLUENCE ON RESEARCH

Of course, the outside academic and clinical medicine communities
could have served as a brake on the tendencies fostered by these
conflicts of interest. But just the opposite has happened, largely because
the academic medical community has itself become enmeshed in intense
conflicts of interest. Without going in depth into the workings of the

22. David Willman, Stealth Merger: Drug Companies and Government Medical Research,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at Al.
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Bayh-Dole Act,23 it is fair to say academic medicine today is dominated
by a generation of academic entrepreneurs who have taken their
government-funded intellectual property and sought to both heal the sick
and make their fortunes by commercializing it. Again, I have no problem
with that.
But it would be foolish to think that such endeavors do not create
huge conflicts of interest: intellectual, financial and emotional. If I think
C-reactive protein levels in the body are a great new way to determine if
someone is going to develop a severe cardiac event, and I own the use of
C-reactive protein as a biomarker for measuring that, and I have started a
company with my university's help to develop and then, hopefully, sell
the test to thousands of hospitals and physicians, then you can rest
assured that I will be a forceful advocate-in the medical literature, in
professional meetings, at federal advisory committee meetings-for that
point of view, and will oppose anyone who thinks this is not something
the medical system either needs or can afford.
Similarly, if I am a clinician who is actively engaged in enrolling
my sick patients in industry-funded clinical trials, I not only make
additional income from this activity, but I have an emotional stake in
hoping that the drug being tested on my patients is going to work. Yes,
the trials are double-blinded and controlled in various ways. But the
possibility of bias enters the equation in numerous ways: from patient
screening, to the choice of endpoints, dosing, and comparator drugs if
any, to the interpretation of the resulting data. Every study that has been
done on the relationship between funding sources and study outcomes
has shown a positive relationship best described as "he who pays the
piper calls the tune."2 4
Do I think the clinicians behind the VIGOR trial lied or were
simply doing Merck's bidding when, in 2001, they wrote in the New
England Journal of Medicine that the reason Vioxx had four times the
cardiovascular deaths than naproxen was that naproxen was
cardioprotective? 25 No, I think they really believed it, because their
professional interests, their humanitarian interests (they believed in the
underlying premise that COX-2 inhibitors would be less harsh on the

23. Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
§ 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2000)).
24. See. e.g., Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of FinancialConflicts of Interest in
Biomedical Research:A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454,454,456 (2003).
25. Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper GastrointestinalToxicity of Rofecoxib and
Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1520, 1526-27 (2000).
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stomach than ibuprofen and aspirin), and, yes, their financial interests
coincided.
Four years later, when the data from this and other trials was
reviewed by an outside advisory committee at the FDA, my organization
revealed that ten out of thirty-two members of the committee had ties to
COX-2 manufacturers. 26 As reported by the New York Times, had those
votes been subtracted from the final tallies, the committee would have
voted to withdraw two of the drugs, including Vioxx, from the market.27
As it was, they voted for a slightly stronger warning on the label.28
One recent study points out that there is no correlation between
29
ultimate votes on FDA advisory committees and conflicts of interest.
As the argument goes: The COX-2 committee was an anomaly. The vast
majority of votes are unanimous or near unanimous: Scientists with
conflicts and those without vote pretty much the same-almost always
for approval. But I think this kind of mechanistic analysis misses the
larger point about how conflicts of interest, which are intellectual as well
as financial, dominate the proceedings. These are, for the most part,
committees made up of clinicians who are deeply interested in helping to
develop the next new breakthrough, and are always on the lookout for
better drugs. The clinicians with conflicts crowd out more critical voices
who can probe the nuances in the data, who are experts in identifying
safety warning signs, drug-to-drug interactions, a drug's impact on comorbidities, and other aspects of the disease that specialists may not be
aware of.
IV.

CONCLUSION: SUGGESTED REFORMS

My project has been heavily involved in lobbying to eliminate
scientists with conflicts from FDA advisory committees for precisely
this reason: It is time to open up the process to new voices with a
broader range of expertise. In other words, it is time to make these

26.

Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Conflicts of Interest on Cox-2 Panel:

Research
from
CSPI's
Integrity
in
Science
Project
(Feb.
25,
2005),
http://www.cspinet.org/new/200502251.html (evaluating, at the bequest of the New York Times,
scientific experts chosen by the FDA to evaluate Cox-2 inhibitors).
27. Id.
28. Gardiner Harris & Alex Berenson, 10 Voters on PanelBacking Pain Pills Had Industry
Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, at A].
29. Peter Lurie et al., FinancialConflict of Interest Disclosure and Voting Patternsat Food
and Drug Administration Drug Advisory Committee Meetings, 295 JAMA 1921, 1921, 1925-26
(2006).
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advisory committees more balanced, which is also a requirement of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act.3 °
The main arguments against this reform are that all experts have
conflicts of interest, and, by eliminating physicians with conflicts of
interest, we will be eliminating the best and the brightest. I think this is a
slander on the thousands of clinicians who conduct NIH-funded clinical
trials, or who work for government organizations like the Department of
Veterans Affairs ("VA") or who simply have not signed onto industry's
payroll. I recently reviewed all of the conflict of interest disclosure
statements for the annual American Society of Clinical Oncology
meeting, which draws nearly 15,000 physicians every year to hear the
latest scientific breakthroughs in cancer research. Over 700 people either
led sessions or made presentations. About two-thirds of them had
conflict of interest statements. This is about in line with the current mix
of clinical trial funding: Industry now funds about sixty to seventy
percent of clinical trials. But that means one-third of them were not
conflicted. If they are qualified to make presentations to the nation's
oncologists, they are equally qualified to serve on federal advisory
committees evaluating new cancer drugs.
While I have spent most of my time discussing the FDA, I would
be remiss if I did not point out that conflicts of interest are also major
factors in the decision-making at other health related agencies like the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") and the Centers for
Disease Control, which is a major player in vaccine development. The
prohibitions in the new senior citizen prescription drug benefit, 3 1 which
were largely written by pharmaceutical industry lobbyists, are exhibit
number one, of course. The law specifically prohibited the government
from either negotiating over price or establishing a universal formulary,
both of which are in common use in other advanced industrial countries
and, I might add, to excellent effect at the VA.
But this is just the tip of the iceberg. Drug industry influence comes
to bear on virtually all CMS coverage decisions, which are often
informed by an outside advisory committee made up of physicians and
economists who often have financial ties to industry. Allow me to
mention just one instance where this has gone. astray: Epoetin ("Epo")
reimbursement in the End Stage Renal Disease Program. Epo is a
30.
amended
31.
108-173,

Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as
at 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 1-15 (2000)).
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
§ 101, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102 (2000)).
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synthetic protein, usually produced in the kidneys, that stimulates the
bone marrow to produce red blood cells. For years, Amgen-funded
scientists conducted studies that suggested increased use of this
legitimate medical breakthrough would be beneficial to these very sick
patients. The trials measured subjective endpoints like alertness and
energy. With results in hand (and often by bringing the clinicians who
conducted the trials to Washington), they successfully lobbied the CMS
to reimburse clinics for their use of Epo to the point where they raised
patients' red blood cell count to nearly normal levels. This has been very
lucrative for Amgen, whose government sales of this one drug are now
over $2 billion annually. But a study that appeared in Health Affairs just
last month showed that this policy has not been very good for patients.32
In fact, as their red blood cell counts approached normal, their mortality
rates rose, which is not really that surprising given that these are people
with severe microvascular distress caused by a lifetime of poorly
controlled hypertension and diabetes-the two primary causes of kidney
failure leading to dialysis in the government End Stage Renal Disease
program.
A number of simple reforms would go a long way toward ending
the conflicts of interest arising from industry's involvement with
government. First, Congress should prohibit scientists, clinicians and
economists with conflicts of interest from serving on health-related
federal advisory committees, especially the ones that are making
science-based decisions about new drugs and devices or Medicare's
payment decisions.
At the same time, the government needs to generate more objective
and more useful information about the drugs that are already on the
market. In the process, this would provide an additional career avenue
for academic physicians who want to pursue cutting-edge research.
Nearly a decade ago, Princeton University health care economist Uwe
Reinhardt proposed something comparable to a one percent tax on
prescription drugs to fund systematic, comparative clinical trials on all
the medicines that are out there so physicians will have an objective
source of information when making treatment determinations. 33 This

32. Dennis Cotter et al., TranslatingEpoetin Research into Practice:The Role of Government
and the Use of Scientific Evidence, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1249, 1255-56 (2006).
33. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Op-Ed, How to Lower the Cost of Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2001, at
AI7 (suggesting that private insurers and the government devote one percent "of their collective
yearly spending on prescription drugs and endow a $1 billion research institute").
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could be done at a new institute at NIH, or at academic medical centers,
and rejuvenate the field of investigator-initiated clinical research.
We need to repeal PDUFA, at least as it is presently structured. If a
cash-strapped Congress does not want to properly fund the FDA with
unrestricted general revenue, it should at least decouple user fees from
any intended use. A regulatory agency, especially one whose mission is
to protect the public from unsafe or ineffective drugs, must have the
freedom to make its own decisions about how to deploy its resources in
carrying out that mission.
And finally, the FDA should be given the power to force industry to
gather data and carry out the post-marketing clinical trials they promise
at the time of approval. Indeed, the same NIH institute that carries out
the clinical effectiveness trials could be given this task, thus creating
another funding source for truly independent research. Ending conflicts
of interest is not about some abstract notion of purity. It is about getting
better science.
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